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Abstract
The article addresses the attempts of contemporary continental philosophy to develop 
a politics that would move beyond the Hobbesian logic of the constitution of political 
community. In their readings of Hobbes, Roberto Esposito and Giorgio Agamben 
emphasize the nihilistic character of Hobbes’s approach to community. For Esposito, 
Hobbes’s commonwealth is legitimized by a prior negation of the originary human 
community in the construction of the state of nature as the state of war. Yet, as Agamben 
shows, this negative state of nature is never fully transcended by the commonwealth, 
which persistently reproduces it in the state of exception. These critiques emphasize 
the complex relation between nature and artifice in Hobbes’s thought, which have pro-
found implications for the attempts to arrive at a ‘post-Hobbesian’ mode of political 
community. Neither a facile search for a truer, more fundamental state of nature nor an 
affirmation of artifice and denaturation as constitutive of human community are suf-
ficient to evade the Hobbesian constellation. A genuine move beyond Hobbes would 
rather consist in thoroughly deactivating the very relation between nature and artifice 
whereby they become indistinct and no longer negate each other.
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 Introduction
Nature and artifice are basic concepts of any political philosophy. Whether it is 
a matter of founding a politics on natural principles or transcending nature 
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through the establishment of an artificial order, abandoning the degraded arti-
ficial social order and returning to nature or intervening in the natural order 
through governmental artifice, political thought exists in the space between 
nature and artifice and as an expression of the tension between them. In con-
temporary continental thought this tension is arguably articulated most 
strongly in the discussion of political community.1 On the one hand, the 20th 
century experience of fascism and Nazism has thoroughly undermined any 
(quasi) naturalist account of political community as the expression of the vital 
substance of a people, nation or race. On the other hand, the alternative under-
standing of community as an artifice or construct, at work in different ways in 
both liberal and Marxist discourses, was no less problematic, often viewed as 
expressing the nihilistic or technological orientation of modern politics, its 
reduction to the management of individual or group interests. Moreover, con-
temporary continental thought has problematized the very distinction 
between nature and artifice, demonstrating both the presence of the natural 
within artificial orders and the artifice involved in every invocation of nature. 
Various strands in continental theory have attempted to reconstruct political 
community in the manner that places it on the side of neither nature nor arti-
fice but rather conceives of community as the site where the very opposition 
of the two terms is rendered inoperative.
The philosophy of Thomas Hobbes has been a privileged interlocutor in this 
enterprise, given the paradigmatic status of the Hobbesian logic of the constitu-
tion of the commonwealth through the negation of the state of nature for all 
modern political thought. In this article, we shall address the readings of Hobbes 
in the work of Roberto Esposito and Giorgio Agamben, who critically engage 
with him in their reconstruction of the concept of political community. These 
readings are significant not merely because of the new interpretation of Hobbes 
that they offer but also because of the function that Hobbes’s philosophy serves 
in them. While Hobbes’s logic of the constitution of the commonwealth as a 
political community has been paradigmatic in modern political thought, these 
authors argue that Hobbes’s paradigmatic move rather consists in the negation 
of community and any contemporary rethinking of political community must 
first grapple with the problem of overcoming or neutralizing this negation.
Thus, both Esposito and Agamben emphasize the nihilistic character of 
Hobbes’s approach, yet do so in different ways. For Esposito, Hobbes’s constitution 
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of the commonwealth is legitimized by a prior construction of community in 
strictly negative terms. The artificial institution of the commonwealth is thus 
preceded and conditioned by another artifice, that of the negation of human 
community in the construction of the state of nature as the state of war. For 
Agamben, the state of nature is similarly an artefact, produced by sovereign 
power through its self-suspension in the state of exception in which the law 
remains ‘in force without significance’. The state of nature does not precede the 
institution of the commonwealth but rather results from its suspension. Best 
exemplified by Hobbes’s interpretation of the sovereign’s right to punish, this 
paradox demonstrates that Hobbes’s state of nature is neither natural nor fully 
transcended by the institution of sovereignty but is a negative foundation of the 
commonwealth itself.
In the second section, we address the problems involved in moving beyond 
the Hobbesian account of political community. We shall demonstrate that nei-
ther a facile search for a truer, more fundamental state of nature than the one 
posited by Hobbes, nor an affirmation of artifice and denaturation as constitu-
tive of human community are sufficient to evade the Hobbesian constellation. 
While every claim to naturalness can be subverted by demonstrating the 
dependence of this nature on numerous artefacts, the claim to have fully tran-
scended nature is equally false, insofar every symbolic order continues to 
depend on the excess that it cannot symbolize and which remains in some 
sense ‘natural’.
The failure of both re-naturalizing and de-naturalizing approaches does 
not, however, entail that we are stuck with the Hobbesian logic of the negative 
foundation. In the third section, we shall demonstrate the way this logic is ren-
dered inoperative in Giorgio Agamben’s notion of form-of-life as a ‘zone of 
indistinction’ between unqualified life and its political form, i.e. between 
nature and artifice. This indistinction suspends the perpetual politicization of 
bare life through its negative ‘inclusive exclusion’ in the commonwealth that 
both Agamben and Esposito have traced in their readings of Hobbes. Instead, 
bare life is no longer something to be politicized, since, as always already its 
own form, it is itself political.
 Hobbesian Nihilism: Community and its Nullification
For Roberto Esposito, Hobbes is the first genuinely nihilist philosopher, insofar 
as nihilism is understood in the Heideggerian manner, not as the expression of 
the nothingness of all things but rather as its nullification. Nihilism recognizes 
the nothing at the heart of being only to turn this ‘nothing’ into a nullity, so 
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that only beings may be said to exist, ‘and nothing besides’.2 What is nullified 
in Hobbes’s political thought is community, understood in ontological terms as 
the originary lack of subjectivity, identity or property that characterizes being-
in-common. In Esposito’s etymology of community, the munus in community 
refers to an obligation, debt or gift to the other that unites its members. What 
is shared in common is therefore not the proper, be it identity or property, but 
rather expropriation, lack and disidentification, the exposure of the self to the 
outside and the other.
Community isn’t an entity, nor is it a collective subject, nor a totality of 
subjects, but rather it is the relation that makes them no longer individ-
ual subjects because it closes them off from their identity with a line, 
which, traversing them, alters them: it is the ‘with’, the ‘between’ and the 
threshold where they meet in a point of contact that brings them into 
relation with others to the degree to which it separates them from 
themselves.3
Community is not merely founded on nothing, i.e., on the absence of common 
presupposition or predicate, but is entirely contained in the exposure of its 
members to the nothing that they have in common: “it is utterly incapable of 
producing effects of commonality, of association, and of communion. It 
doesn’t keep us warm and it doesn’t protect us; on the contrary, it exposes us to 
the most extreme of risks: that of losing, along with our individuality, the bor-
ders that guarantee its inviolability with respect to the other, of suddenly fall-
ing into the nothingness of the thing.”4
This is where nihilism comes in, not as an attribute of this community but 
rather of its negation. While in the case of community the ‘nothing’ referred to 
being as relation, as opposed to an entity, what is at stake in nihilism is the dis-
solution of this relation itself, the nullification of nothing. It is this relegation of 
the relation to non-being that Esposito traces in Hobbes:
The fact that Hobbes inaugurates modern political nihilism should not 
be simply understood in the sense that he ‘discovers’ the nothingness 
of substance of a world freed from the metaphysical constraint of any 
transcendental veritas; Hobbes rather ‘covers’ this nothingness of 
substance again with another, more powerful nothingness, which is 
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precisely the function of annihilating the potentially dissolutive effects 
of the first.5
In Esposito’s interpretation, Hobbes’s attempt to found sovereign power is con-
ditioned by the prior conversion of the originary nothingness of community 
into the secondary, artificial nothingness that he constructs in terms of the 
state of nature as ‘state of war’. It is only when community in the sense of the 
originary sharing of nothing in a reciprocal exposure and expropriation is 
negated, that an infinite multiplicity of boundaries is drawn between the 
members of the community and we find ourselves in a familiar condition of a 
perpetual and universal predisposition towards war. The negation of commu-
nity introduces into the world a negativity that in Hobbes’s theory takes the 
form of equal capacity to kill – the sole link that now binds individuals together, 
since everything else is divided between particular identities. The originary 
condition of exposure to the other that expropriates one’s identity is converted 
into an “unstoppable series of potential crimes.”6 The contingent dangers 
involved in the exposure to the other are converted into the necessary danger-
ousness of being-in-common as a ‘natural fact’. This construction of the state 
of nature leads Hobbes to a logical conclusion: “[if] the relation between men 
is in itself destructive, the only route of escape from this unbearable state of 
affairs is the destruction of the relation itself.”7 If every relation is defective and 
dangerous, then security can only be attained by abolishing every relation in 
having everyone relate only to a Third, i.e., the sovereign. The sovereign thus 
becomes the universal mediator in the newly constructed world of the 
commonwealth, which, despite its name, is not a community at all, but a para-
doxical ‘union’ wholly contained in dissociation: “the state is the desocializa-
tion of the communitarian bond.”8 If the originary community united its 
members around the shared munus, the institution of sovereign power exempts 
everyone from this munus, thereby immunizing them against the danger they 
all pose to one another.9
It is important to note that we encounter the figure of nothingness or nega-
tivity not once, nor even twice, but three times in Hobbes’s constitution of the 
commonwealth. The originary nothingness of community as the sharing of 
lack or expropriation is first negated in the construction of the state of nature 
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as the state of perpetual reciprocal danger, which in turn finds itself negated 
one more time by the institution of artificial sovereign authority which neu-
tralizes the negativity of nature. We thus move from the negativity of the 
munus through its negation as the fictitious state of nature to the final nega-
tion of this state in the mode of the artificial order of the commonwealth. The 
state of nature is thus a ‘negative foundation’ of the commonwealth in two 
senses: firstly, it is a product of the negation of the originary community of 
sharing the nothingness of munus, and, secondly, it itself exists only to be 
negated by the institution of sovereignty. Yet, this final negation can never fully 
efface the negativity of the state of nature but can only restrict it to the sover-
eign who, as it were, absorbs it entirely in its own figure: ‘the state of nature is 
not overcome once and for all by the civil, but resurfaces again in the same 
figure of the sovereign, because it is the only one to have preserved natural 
right in a context in which all the others have given it up.’10 This preservation 
of natural right is best exemplified by the ‘right to punish’, which in Hobbes’s 
own argument is only conceivable as the right retained by the sovereign from 
the state of nature:
[It] is manifest that the Right which the Common-wealth (that is, he or 
they that represent it) have to Punish, is not grounded on any concession 
or gift of the Subjects. For the Subjects did not give the Soveraign that 
right; but onely in laying down theirs, strengthened him to use his own, 
as he should think fit, for the preservation of them all: so that it was not 
given, but left to him, and to him onely; and (excepting the limits set him 
by naturall Law) as entire, as in the condition of meer Nature, and of 
warre of every one against his neighbour.11
Ironically, the only remnant of nature left in the commonwealth is thus the 
artificial “mortal god” itself, which denatures everything with the exception of 
itself and retains within the commonwealth that power of death that charac-
terized every relation in the state of nature. In Giorgio Agamben’s reading of 
Hobbes, this “preservation” of the right to punish serves as the paradigm of the 
sovereign state of exception, in which the positive content of the law is sus-
pended yet its force remains intact. The state of nature is thus not antecedent 
to the commonwealth but rather the effect of the suspension of its positive 
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norms by the sovereign itself: “The state of nature is not a real epoch chrono-
logically prior to the foundation of the City, but a principle internal to the City, 
which appears at the moment the City is considered tanquam dissoluta, ‘as if it 
were dissolved’.”12 Rather than approach the state of nature as something 
negated and transcended by sovereignty, Agamben views it as the product of 
sovereignty that itself negates its positive content. Yet, sovereign power is also 
an effect of negation. Whereas Esposito discusses the object of this negation in 
terms of community, Agamben addresses it in terms of life. Hobbes’s institu-
tion of the positive order of the commonwealth (bios) is attained through the 
negation of unqualified life (zoe) that produces the very negativity that it then 
seeks to subsume under the state of nature. Agamben terms this negativity 
‘bare life’, a life stripped of all positive predicates and exposed to the possibility 
of death. Yet, just as in Esposito’s argument, this bare life is nothing natural and 
should not be equated with zoe itself. It is rather a result of what Agamben calls 
the ‘inclusive exclusion’ of zoe into bios in the degraded and destitute form of 
“mere life” that is the object of politicization.13 It does not precede the exis-
tence of sovereignty and call for its establishment, but is rather produced by 
the sovereign act of self-suspension, whereby the subject ends up abandoned 
to the arbitrary force of law devoid of all significance.14 For both Esposito and 
Agamben, Hobbes’s political community ultimately ends up threatening that 
which it was meant to protect, i.e. human life itself: “[Set] in motion by the 
demand of protecting the thing from the nothing that seems to threaten it, 
Hobbes winds up destroying the thing itself with nothing.”15
This is due to the failure of Hobbes (and, for both authors, modern political 
philosophy more generally) to understand the nothingness at the heart of 
community in a non-nihilistic way, i.e. otherwise than as something superflu-
ous, inessential or dangerous that must be nullified. While the relation between 
beings is indeed dangerous, insofar as it introduces lack and expropriation and 
ruptures the identities of individuals, its nullification does nothing to protect 
these individuals but rather leaves them exposed to the power that operates 
with the same means of expropriation and rupture, serving as the sole descen-
dant of the state of nature that claims to negate: “Modern nihilism did not 
want or know how to excavate any deeper into the nothing of the relation, and 
so finds itself consigned to the nothing of the absolute, of absolute nothing.”16
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Both Esposito’s and Agamben’s readings place the relation between nature 
and artifice at the heart of Hobbes’s political thought. Hobbes’s absolutist 
and sacrificial politics does not descend from the originary evil of human 
beings universally or of any human being in particular, however this evil 
might be construed. The origin of this politics is rather the introduction into 
the world of the force of negation of the originary community or unqualified 
life - the artifice presented as natural so as to be negated by yet another arti-
fice that appropriates the power of negation as its exclusive prerogative. The 
logic of sovereign power consists in the ‘denaturalizing’ protection of the 
commonwealth from the secondary negativity that was produced and ‘natu-
ralized’ through the nullification of the primary nothingness of community. 
In this manner, the commonwealth secured by sovereign power ends up 
closed off from its ontological foundation in community or zoe and instead 
endowed with a wholly fictitious ‘political ontology’, which takes as the ori-
gin of the commonwealth the negative artifice reinscribed in the more edify-
ing terms of the ‘state of nature’. These political ontologies may veer into 
different and even opposite directions from this starting point, e.g. towards 
the eradication of the state of nature or its valorization, the transcendence 
of nature through culture or the naturalization of culture itself. Yet, as long 
as politics loses sight of what precedes this ‘nature’ and is negated by it, it 
remains stuck in nihilism and ends up threatening the lives it claims to 
protect.
 Towards a Post-Hobbesian Community: Beyond Naturalization  
and Denaturalization
Evidently, the reading of Hobbes espoused by Esposito and Agamben may be 
criticized as one-sided or hyperbolic, ignoring the details and intricacies in 
Hobbes’s argument in favour of a grand epochal interpretation of Hobbes as a 
nihilist avant la lettre. It would certainly be possible to counter Agamben’s 
focus on the sovereign right to punish by highlighting Hobbes’s retention of 
the individual right of resistance when its personal security, for which he gives 
up his natural right, is threatened.17 Alternatively, Esposito’s insistence on 
Hobbes’s negation of the anterior community may be viewed as excessive in 
the light of Hobbes’s relative retention of the freedom of inner belief in the 
commonwealth, which his more authoritarian critics viewed as a symptom of 
his insufficient negation of the state of nature that eventually dooms the 
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Leviathan.18 Yet, what we are interested in is less the exegetical accuracy of 
Agamben’s and Esposito’s interpretations than the paradigmatic character of 
their reading.
For both Esposito and Agamben it is less a matter of exhaustively interpret-
ing Hobbes than of relying on his thought to establish a particularly illustrative 
or striking example of a tendency in modern political thought to constitute 
and legitimize authority by conjuring the negativity that it then interprets as 
natural and seeks protection from. While Hobbes could undoubtedly be read 
in other, less hyperbolic and more appreciative ways, it is this reading that has 
attracted most attention in contemporary continental philosophy, also preoc-
cupied with the relation between nature and artifice in today’s political life. 
The reason for this is arguably the growing realization that the Hobbesian solu-
tion to the problem of community that marked the beginning of political 
modernity has become inoperative, exacerbating the problem rather than 
resolving it. If Hobbes’s logic of sovereignty is viewed as resigning modern poli-
tics to the pursuit of security through negative means, perpetually threatening 
what it claims to protect, the question of a post-Hobbesian political commu-
nity becomes a matter of exigency.19
If we approach Hobbes in terms of the artificial constitution of the state 
of nature as a negative foundation of political community, what could a gen-
uinely post-Hobbesian approach be? For Esposito, “Hobbes’s solution is 
derived from an altogether negative and even catastrophic interpretation of 
the principle of condivision, the initial sharing of being. It is precisely this 
negativity attributed to the original community that justifies the sovereign 
order.”20 It therefore appears that the way to avoid the spiraling of negativity 
that characterizes Hobbes’s nihilism consists in the reaffirmation of the 
originary nothingness of community as the first, proper, real state of nature. 
If we abandon Hobbes’s nullification of this originary natural community in 
an ‘altogether negative’ artifact of the state of nature, we would presumably 
also be spared the subsequent negation of that artifact in the form of sover-
eign power, whose legitimacy is, after all, only established on the basis of the 
construction of the state of nature as the site of perpetual and universal 
danger.
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This reaffirmation of the originary community does not only characterize 
Esposito’s own project but applies more generally to the contemporary rethink-
ing of political community in continental philosophy: for all their important 
differences, Agamben’s community of ‘whatever singularities’, Jean-Luc 
Nancy’s ‘inoperative’ community, Alain Badiou’s ‘generic’ subject or Jacques 
Ranciere’s ‘people’ are all posited as subtracted from any positive predicate and 
instead defined by the sheer facticity of being-there prior to any predication or 
determination. At the same time, all these examples clearly indicate the diffi-
culty of subsuming the phenomena in question under the label of ‘nature’. 
While originary in the sense of not being preceded and conditioned by any-
thing, Esposito’s community is from the outset characterized by the expropria-
tion of the proper, the withdrawal of substance, the alteration of identity – in 
short, the prostheses of negativity that prevent this ‘nature’ from ever attaining 
anything like full presence and self-identity. What lies at the origin is always a 
supplement in the Derridean sense of constitutive alterity, the condition of 
possibility that at the same time undermines or ruptures the unity, presence or 
givenness of the phenomenon.21 The lack introduced by the munus character-
izes Esposito’s community from the outset, there having been nothing to pre-
cede it, no natural bliss later disturbed by the imperative of obligation or gift. 
Thus, if we want to overcome Hobbes by positing as natural the condition that 
precedes his own negative move of ‘naturalization’, we are bound to be disap-
pointed: what precedes the artifact of the Hobbesian state of nature is a condi-
tion that is just as artificial and de-natured.
On the other hand, we should also resist the anti-naturalist disposition, par-
ticularly when it comes in the form of an anthropocentrism that converts the 
originary denaturation of human beings into a privileged status of having 
somehow left nature behind for artificial, symbolic structures and institutions. 
Irrespectively of whether this privilege is supposed to endow us with authority 
over the rest of nature or the burden of responsibility for it (or both), the claim 
of the human being to have transcended the natural realm for the symbolic 
realm of artifice is ultimately false for at least two reasons.
Firstly, as our discussion of Hobbes’s account of the right to punish as the 
‘remainder’ of the state of nature within the commonwealth demonstrated, no 
such transcendence may ever be complete, since every symbolic realm of 
nomos is constitutively dependent on an ‘anomic’ space within it that resists 
subsumption under its positive rules, norms or principles. “[T]his space devoid 
of law seems to be so essential to the juridical order that it must seek in every 
60  Prozorov 
Hobbes Studies 28 (2015) 50-63
22 Agamben, State of Exception (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), 51.
23 See Paolo Virno, Multitude between Innovation and Negation (New York: Semiotext(e), 
2008), pp. 31–61; Esposito, Immunitas: The Protection and Negation of Life (London: Polity, 
2011), pp. 80–111.
24 Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama (London: Verso, 2003), 85.
25 See Esposito, Living Thought: The Origins and Actuality of Italian Philosophy  
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013).
way to assure itself a relation with it, as if in order to ground itself the juridical 
order necessarily had to maintain itself in relation with an anomie.”22 As 
authors as different as Carl Schmitt and Jacques Lacan have demonstrated in 
different ways, there always remains an excess of the real that resists symbol-
ization, a quasi-natural element that cannot be subsumed under the artificial 
order and plunges this order back into pre-symbolic, be this in the form of the 
sovereign state of exception or the formations of the unconscious. Even if the 
nature in question is as artificial as the symbolic order it disrupts, it remains a 
negative foundation of the latter, founding it precisely by escaping from it.
On the other hand, as philosophical anthropology of the early 20th century 
argued, the very attempt at the symbolic transcendence of nature arises from 
and defines our nature itself. It is precisely the naturally open, incomplete, 
potential and “out of sync” status of the human being that accounts for its 
need for and its development of symbolic structures of artifice that compen-
sate for its lack of determinate environment.23 The engagement in symbolic 
artifice is thus itself part of human nature. Thus, every attempt at the tran-
scendence of nature inevitably returns one to the natural immanence from 
which it necessarily arises. Instead of the Hobbesian image of the Leviathan 
as a ‘mortal god’, contemporary post-Hobbesian perspectives rather remind 
one of Walter Benjamin’s figure of the baroque sovereign, “a lord of creatures 
that remains a creature” and perpetually fails to transcend the realm from 
which it arises.24
While our political imagination is today more attuned to the critique of 
every kind of naturalization, which finds the mediated and the constructed 
beneath every claim to natural immediacy, what is at stake here is the diamet-
rically opposite strategy that would supplement the exposure of artifice in 
every pretense to natural authenticity with a ‘re-naturalizing’ critique that 
exposes the falsity of every claim to transcend nature and disrupts the closure 
of every symbolic order into self-immanence.25 The post-Hobbesian account 
of the relation between nature and artifice can therefore give privilege to nei-
ther nature nor artifice, yet, as we shall demonstrate in the final section, is not 
exhausted by affirming the tension between the two.
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 Form-of-Life
If we cannot oppose the Hobbesian constitution of the state of nature as a 
negative foundation of the political order by either a return to nature or its 
ultimate transcendence in a symbolic order devoid of any natural remainder, 
the post-Hobbesian perspective appears to be limited to lamenting the spiral 
of negativity unleashed by the very constitution of political community and 
therefore apparently unavoidable as long as we continue to live in such com-
munities. The mortal god would then be demoted to the mortal devil without 
anything else changing. Yet, the post-Hobbesian perspective also has a strong 
affirmative dimension, developed most explicitly in Agamben’s work. From 
the early 1990s onwards Agamben has developed an idea of a ‘form-of-life’ as 
an alternative to the bare life captured in the sovereign state of exception. 
Since in the Hobbesian logic the political order is constituted by the negation 
of unqualified life and its inclusion in the destitute mode of bare life, the sole 
way out of this negative structure appears to be a politics constituted out of 
unqualified life itself. Thus, Agamben opposes every idea of politics as “the 
place in which life had to transform itself into good life and in which what had 
to be politicized was always already bare life”26 and instead poses the question 
of whether “zoe really needs to be politicized or politics [is] already contained 
at its center.”27 At the end of Homo Sacer he answers this question affirmatively 
with the following programmatic statement: “This biopolitical body that is 
bare life must itself instead be transformed into the site for the constitution 
and installation of a form of life that is wholly exhausted in bare life and a bios 
that is only its own zoe.”28 This statement is simultaneously enigmatic and rig-
orous. Indeed, if the political form of bios is founded by the inclusion of zoe in 
the negated mode of bare life, then the suspension of this negation requires 
that bios and zoe become entirely indistinct. In this manner, life and its form 
would become entirely inseparable, bios being entirely contained in zoe, so 
that it is ‘no longer possible to isolate anything like a bare life’.29 This means 
precisely that zoe is no longer politicized or that politics no longer seeks to 
transform life ‘as such’ into ‘good life’, but is somehow located at the center of 
life itself. Yet, what could it possibly mean to locate politics in the unqualified 
life as such?
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Agamben’s solution becomes clearer with the help of the analogy he draws 
between bare life in biopolitics and pure being in philosophy:
[In] the syntagm ‘bare life’, ‘bare’ corresponds to the Greek haplos, the 
term by which first philosophy defines pure Being. And it may be that 
only if we are able to decipher the political meaning of pure Being will we 
be able to master the bare life that expresses our subjection to political 
power.30
On the basis of this analogy between bare life and pure being Agamben estab-
lishes the political equivalent of Heidegger’s inversion of the relation between 
essence and existence in Being and Time.31 “Today bios lies in zoe exactly as 
essence, in the Heideggerian definition of Dasein, lies in existence.”32 If the 
essence of the human is unpresentable in terms of essential predicates (‘what 
one is’) but consists in the sheer facticity of its existence (‘that one is’), then the 
sole form of bios proper to the human is indeed its own zoe, whose facticity is 
no longer the negated foundation of bios but rather its entire content, there 
being no other form, essence, task or identity that could be imposed on it. 
What Agamben calls form-of-life, the hyphens emphasizing the integrity of life 
and its form, may then be understood as “a being that is its own bare existence, 
[a] life that, being its own form, remains inseparable from it.”33
We encounter this figure of an integral form-of-life in the most diverse con-
texts of Agamben’s work: the ‘coming community’ of whatever singularities,34 
the experimentum linguae that communicates the sheer existence of language 
and not its signified contents,35 the “glorious body” that is nothing but the 
earthly body divested of its functions and open to a new use,36 Franciscan 
monastic life extraneous to every law and norm,37 ‘eternal life’ in the Messiah,38 
etc. While many of these examples are somewhat arcane or esoteric, it is 
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important to emphasize that the term ‘form-of-life’ does not refer to any spe-
cific kind of life, which would be a bios that is by definition distinct from zoe as 
unqualified life and would entail the negation of the latter. It is instead a mat-
ter of treating any positive bios as nothing but a zoe, suspending every qualifi-
cation while embracing the unqualified or, in Agamben’s terms, the ‘unmarked’ 
in every form of life.39 What unites the diverse figures above is precisely their 
subtraction from every particular predicate and their exposure in the bare fac-
ticity of their existence or ‘being-thus’. A bios that is its own zoe is not some 
particular bios, some concrete form of life, but rather whatever bios, insofar as 
it is taken up solely in the aspect of its zoe. This obviously does not mean that 
this form of life is devoid of any real predicates but rather that these predicates 
are taken up all at once and thereby neutralized, no longer functioning as the 
conditions of belonging and exclusion: being-thus is ‘neither this nor that, nei-
ther thus nor thus, but thus, as it is, with all its predicates (all its predicates is 
not a predicate).’40
As a form, a form-of-life is certainly an artefact, yet, insofar as the sole mate-
rial for this artifice is life as such, it necessarily remains natural. Conversely, as 
a form of life, this form is irreducibly natural, yet, insofar as this life is insepa-
rable from its form, we are evidently in the domain of artifice. A form-of-life is 
thus an artifice that works on or rather plays with its own nature and a nature 
which creates artefacts out of itself. It is this understanding of life as naturally 
artificial that is genuinely post-Hobbesian, insofar as it is content neither with 
finding behind Hobbes’s fictitious ‘state of nature’ another, presumably more 
natural state nor with rehearsing his claim about the possibility to transcend 
such a natural state. It rejects the very idea of separating nature and artifice, 
and consequently the very idea of the protection of nature through its nega-
tion in the formation of an artificial order and the protection of this order 
through the negation of the very nature it protects. Instead, the form-of-life 
becomes a site of a politics, in which the natural and the artificial are insepa-
rable and could not possibly be conceived as needing protection from each 
other.
